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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

in the underlying action, he may nevertheless find himself the
proceedings by the Bar Association for his
subject of 10disciplinary
3
negligence.
CPLR 3221: Judgment by consent in property damage action may
be alleged in later personal injury action.
CPLR 3221 allows a defendant in any other than a matrimonial action to serve plaintiff a written offer to allow judgment
to be entered against him. If the plaintiff accepts, judgment is
entered accordingly. The section further provides that "[a]n offer
of judgment shall not be made known to the jury."
In Card v. Budini104 the plaintiff in a personal injury action
alleged in her complaint a judgment entered, in accordance with
CPLR 3221, against defendant in a prior property damage action
arising out of the same accident. The appellate division, third
department, reversed the supreme court's decision to strike out the
allegation. The court carefully noted the language of 3221 that an
offer of judgment shall not be made known to the jury. The court
interpreted this to mean that the prohibition lay in using an offer
which had not been reduced to a judgment. The court stated,
further, that the words "the jury" indicated not any jury in a
subsequent action but the jury in the case where an offer had been
made and rejected. The judgment in the property damage10 5action
could, therefore, be properly pleaded in the present action.
It was early established by the Court of Appeals that a judgment entered by a stipulation of the parties was conclusive in a
The rationale of the
later action involving the same issues.?°
Court was that a judgment by consent or by express stipulation
should not be given any less conclusive effect than a judgment by
default.'0 7 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has expressed the
opinion that the plaintiff as well as the defendant can make use
of a prior judgment.' °
With this foundation, then, it appears that any settlement or
compromise which is reduced to a judgment vill be given conclu103 Sce Ip re Satz, 12 App. Div. 2d 232, 209 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (lst Dep't

1961); In re Shelton, 7 App. Div. 2d 135, 181 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep't 1959).
10429 App. Div. 2d 35, 285 N.Y.S.2d 734 (3rd Dep't 1967).
105 See WACHTELL, NEv YoRK PAcrIcE UNDER THE CPLR 316 (2d ed.
1966).
In that
'06Crouse v. McVickar, 207 N.Y. 213, 100 N.E. 697 (1912).
case a stipulation entered into by the parties in an action to determine
who was entitled to an estate, that each would share equally, was conclusive in a later action by one of the parties grounded upon fraud.
107 See Canfield v. Elmer E. Harris & Co., 252 N.Y. 502, 170 N.E.
121 (1930).
loS B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
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sive effect in later actions involving the same
the same issues. Therefore, an attorney who
an insignificant property damage claim should
ment and discontinuance of the action lest he
quent personal injury defense. 109
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parties concerning
desires to concede
strive for a settleendanger a subse-

Res Judicata: Collateral attack on Mexican divorce.
In Schoenbrod v. Siegler,110 the parties to the dispute had been
married in the British West Indies. They subsequently entered
into a separation agreement in New York, and a month later were
divorced in Mexico, the husband appearing personally and the wife
by attorney. The separation agreement was incorporated into the
Mexican decree. Later, the husband discovered that the marriage
had been performed illegally and instituted an action in the Mexican
court to vacate the judgment of divorce; but he failed because
Mexico does not allow a divorce decree to be reopened for the
admission of new evidence. In the meantime the wife had instituted a suit against the husband for arrears due under the separation agreement, and the husband in turn instituted the instant
action to have the separation agreement declared null and void.
Evidence was introduced to show that while Mexico would not
permit a direct attack on its divorce decree, it would allow a collateral attack on the separation agreement incorporated into the
decree. The wife's motion to dismiss was ultimately denied by
the Court of Appeals which held that the Mexican divorce was
not res judicata as to the validity of the marriage.
The Court of Appeals had previously held in Statter v.
Statter ' that a separation decree conclusively established the
existence of a valid marriage and therefore barred a subsequent
action for annulment. The Court in that case stressed the need
for stability and security 'in judgments and, therefore, if new evidence were discovered, the proper procedure would be to vacate
the original decree.
The Court in the instant case, while recognizing that the conclusive effect on the validity of a marriage is the same when the
first judgment is for divorce rather than separation, 1 2 and while
recognizing that it made no difference, because of comity, that the
109 See Schenker v. Bourne, 278 App. Div. 699, 102 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2d

Dep't 1951); Johnson v. Tyler, 275 App. Div. 726, 87 N.Y.S.2d 177 (3d
Dep't 1949).
11020 N.Y.2d 403, 230 N.E.2d 638, 283 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1967).
1112 N.Y.2d 668, 143 N.E.2d 10, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1957).
1'12See Frost v. Frost, 260 App. Div. 694, 23 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1st Dep't

1940), where a Nevada divorce was held to conclusively establish the existence of the marriage, thus barring a subsequent action to declare the marriage void.

